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At a recent reception,
a friend at the Danish Institute for Human
Rights was taking leave of her colleagues to
start a new position at the Danish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. She spoke of her feelings
about moving to the Ministry from the
Institute, where she had worked for fifteen
years as an expert on human rights, and
recalled an experience from her girlhood.
As any girl who rides horses knows, she
related, there was always the big beast
which only the riding instructor had
permission to ride. Then the day came
when she too was allowed to take out the
big horse. She found that he liked her
carrots and was actually a nice guy. In fact,
she could even begin to make friends with
the beast – a useful image for her as she was
taking up her new position at the Ministry.
It struck me that this image is also useful
in conveying some of the dilemmas faced
by feminists, both NGO activists and
aca-demic feminists, in assessing advances
made within the United Nations system
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UN Res. 1325 is a revolutionary
transformation of rhetoric 
regarding issues of women, peace,
and security. In the last dozen years,
there has been a proliferation of 
debates about its successes and its
failures. Should its limitations be
understood as failures in implemen-
tation? Or should the concepts of
women, gender, and violence which
frame the resolution be critically
challenged?
with regard to the agenda known as
Women, Peace and Security. Is it friend or
foe? On the one hand, Security Council
Resolution 1325, adopted on October 31,
2000, represents a revolutionary trans-
formation of rhetoric that is the result of
relentless   labor by the NGOs responsible
for the groundwork. It is remarkable to
imagine the men of the Security Council
putting  into their mouths the language
underscoring the importance of main-
streaming a gender perspective and the
importance of the representation, participa-
tion, and    protection of women from rape
and other forms of sexual abuse (Resolu-
tion 1325 of 2000), language noting
women’s empowerment in peacemaking
processes  (Resolution 1889 of 2009) and
language reaffirming the need to end
impunity and to implement a policy of zero
tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse
(Resolution 1820 of 2008) (Kuehnast, de
Jonge Oudraat, and Hernes 2011: 131-
155).1 With this language ringing in our
ears, it seems that the limitations of the
Women, Peace, and Security agenda should
be understood as lying not with its con-
cepts but with its implementation, despite
the  assiduous efforts of NGOs around the
world to translate Resolution 1325 out of
‘UN language’ into more than a hundred,
more accessible languages2 (Cohn 2004: 7).
On the other hand, many academic femi-
nists have claimed that the resolutions are
organized around concepts of gender and
violence that falsely fix bodies into biologi-
cally determined sexual differences
(Shepherd 2008: 106). With the focus on
‘women as peacemakers’, the Women,
Peace and Security agenda leaves the
dominant political and epistemological
frameworks about gender and security
untouched, despite its appearance of
serving more progressive goals. Moreover,
the dynamics of gender in security relations
cannot be separated from the workings of
economic, political or military institutions.
As Carol Cohn argues, even if peaceable
women held peace talks, would it make a
difference if the global arms trade con-
tinued to expand, with 80% of the profits
going to the five permanent members of
the Security Council, if international finan-
cial institutions foreclose the possibility of
creating a citizenry free enough from want
that they can become democratically
empowered, if security continues to be
understood in terms of state security with
huge standing armies, and if the role of
gender regimes in relation to these factors
remains invisible (Cohn 2004: 18)? 
From this brief summary, it appears that
NGO activists have been better at making
friends with the beast than many academic
feminists. (However, the former also pay a
price for this friendship, as NGO activists in
the Working Group on Women, Peace and
Security have changed their ways of speak-
ing and thinking to make their activities
and political agenda more attractive to UN
policy-shaping processes (Cohn 2004:8).)
But when academic feminists challenge the
epistemological and political frameworks of
the Women, Peace and Security agenda,
one can argue that they also are making
friends with the beast by carrying out the
role of the gadfly.3 In pointing out pro-
blematic assumptions, gaps and blind spots
in knowledge, and local variations,
academic feminists contest what counts as
knowledge about gender and violence. 
After providing some background to the
Women, Peace and Security agenda, I will
examine some key assumptions about the
concepts of women, gender, and violence
embedded in Resolution 1325, which is a
centerpiece of this agenda. In doing so, I
draw on debates in international relations,
gender mainstreaming,4 and philosophical
discussions of violence. As debates amongst
academic feminists illustrate, there is a
‘theory gap’ between researchers’ under-
standing of gender and violence and the
way these terms are used in this security
agenda. Many academic feminists are highly
critical of the way in which gender is
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treated in Resolution 1325 as if it were a
characterization of pre-existing, natural
differences belonging to the sexes (or more
accurately, belonging to the one sex that is
treated as having a sex). Instead of treating
concepts of gender and violence as if they
were static properties for possession or use,
it is crucial to understand them as dynamic
processes. Doing so enables one to move
away from a framework of interpretation
that treats violence as acts committed
against individuals because of their sexuality
and gender, and towards a broader under-
standing of how violence is productive of
gendered subjectivities and bodies, as well
as how violence is immanent in gendered
norms. In doing so, one challenges the
asymmetry in understandings of gender
and violence in the Women, Peace and
Security agenda, while developing the
ambiguity implicit in these relations, which
allows for more complex understandings of
the dynamics of gender and violence.
BACKGROUND TO THE WOMEN, 
PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA
Resolution 1325 marks the first time that
the Security Council directly addressed the
issue of women in armed conflict. It was
also the first time that gender has been
mainstreamed in relation to armed conflict
and security, rather than in terms of devel-
opment and human rights issues (Cohn
2004: 2). It has been supplemented by
subsequent Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889
and 1960. Resolution 1325 calls on the
UN and member states to address abuses
against women during conflicts, including
sexual and gender-based violence; to
protect displaced women; to train peace-
keepers and security forces in gender
awareness; to rebuild institutions that
provide essential services to women; and to
support women’s organizational efforts in
conflict prevention and peacemaking
(Willet 2010: 142). Its documentary
heritage includes previous resolutions
relating to the protection of children (also
in armed conflict), as well as the security
needs of women, children and the elderly
in refugee camps (Shepherd 2008: 108). 
The resolution is the result of the bold
work of NGOs concerned with women and
war and their determination to influence
‘the most powerful global governance
institution in the area of international peace
and security’ (Cohn 2004: 3). Its genesis
can be traced back to the 1995 Beijing
Platform for Action’s chapter on women
and armed conflict, and its review in
Beijing +5. In March 2000, the NGO
Working Group on Women, Peace, and
Security was formed to press for a resolu-
tion. Its founding members were the
Women’s International League for Peace
and Freedom, Amnesty International,
International Alert, the Hague Appeal for
Peace, the Women’s Commission for
Refugee Women and Children and the
Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice. The
NGOs prepared the entire groundwork for
the resolution, including reviewing every
UN document for relevance to the WPS
agenda, providing a compendium of
‘agreed language’ and bringing women
from conflict zones to address the Security
Council. The working group self-
consciously positioned themselves as
helpers rather as adversaries of the Council.
NGOs have continued to make Resolution
1325 a living document by making it
known to grassroots women’s organiza-
tions in conflict zones, by translating it
widely and by providing national and inter-
national actors with timely information, so
they could no longer say ‘We had no way
of knowing.’ In this way, although the
Resolution addresses actors within the UN
system and its member states, the NGOs
have successfully used it ‘on the ground’
for consciousness-raising, for gaining
political influence and for pressing for
accountability (Cohn 2004: 4-6). 
As Carol Cohn notes, the Working
Group’s members defined themselves
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neither as ‘anti-war’ nor as feminist. They
shared divergent conceptual frameworks,
but were generally cautious of falling into
the ‘too political’ category. In this way,
they narrowed the realm of analysis of war,
militarism, and armed violence to focus on
two issues: 1) prising women from the
victim category that Cynthia Enloe has
dubbed ‘womenandchildren’; and 2)
focusing on women’s ‘agency’, which
quickly became translated into ‘women as
peacemakers’ (Cohn 2004: 12-13). Despite
the achievements of the NGOs in getting
the issues on the agenda of international
security, their framing remains mired in the
imagined polarities of  masculine/feminine,
aggressive/peaceful, protector/protected
that feminists working in war studies, inter-
national relations, and other related fields
have persistently challenged. 
THE CONCEPT OF WOMEN IN
THE WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY
AGENDA
In a 1999 essay, the feminist legal theorist
Catharine A. MacKinnon asks, “Are
Women Human?” And she answers, 
If women were human, would we be a cash
crop shipped from Thailand in containers
into New York’s brothels? Would we be
sexual and reproductive slaves? ...Would our
genitals be sliced out to ‘cleanse’ us (our
body parts are dirt?), to control us, to mark
us and define our cultures? ...Would we be
beaten nearly to death, and to death, by men
with whom we are close? Would we be
sexually molested in our families? Would we
be raped in genocide to terrorize and eject
and destroy our ethnic communities, and
raped again in that undeclared war that goes
on every day in every country in the world in
what is called peacetime?... Being a woman is
‘not yet a name for a way of being human’…
Women need full human status in social
reality. For this, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights must see the ways women
distinctively are deprived of human rights as a
deprivation of humanity. (MacKinnon 2006:
41-43)
MacKinnon’s powerful rhetoric also under-
lines one of the paradoxes of the Women,
Peace and Security agenda. On the one
hand, women’s human rights should be
protected by all UN documents. On the
other hand, Resolution 1325 recognizes
the need to protect ‘the special needs and
human rights of women and children in
conflict situations’ and to take account of
‘gender considerations and the rights of
women…’ (Kuehnast 2011: 132, 134).
Many feminists recognize the paradox that,
as Linda Zerilli formulates it, the universal
is always attached ‘to some particular body
which cannot be fully divested of its
particularity,’ hence can never be ‘sexually
indifferent.’ And yet the claims ‘to sexual
difference cannot be made in the absence
of a universal reference…’ (Zerilli 1998:
16). Echoing this theoretical understand-
ing, feminist scholars acknowledge that the
particular situations, threats, and insecuri-
ties generated by the sexual differentiation
of human lives are central to peace and
security. But they object to the ways in
which Resolution 1325 identifies sexual
difference with women, vulnerability,
maternalism, and peacemaking. In doing
so, the document does not merely mirror
qualities perceived as feminine and mas-
culine, but rather produces certain types of
femininities and masculinities (Väyrynen
2004: 140). In portraying these categories
as if they were representations of pre-
existing qualities, this approach naturalizes
them. When   gender attributions appear as
necessary rather than contingent, as
unchanging rather than fluid, there are also
political   effects. As Cynthia Cockburn has
noted more generally about essentialism,
‘It is a dangerous political force, designed
to shore up differences and inequalities, to
sustain dominations’ (Cockburn 1998:
13).5
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One of the weaknesses of Resolution
1325 is that, although it acknowledges that
sexual difference is significant for war, it
implies that only women are vulnerable as
sexed beings in war. In this way, it reiterates
the asymmetry between the sexes that
Simone de Beauvoir diagnosed in The
Second Sex in 1949, the year after the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
‘The term masculine and feminine are used
symmetrically only as a matter of form, as
on legal papers. In actuality the relation of
the two sexes is not quite like that of two
electrical poles, for man represents both the
positive and the neutral … whereas woman
represents only the negative, defined by
limiting criteria, without reciprocity’
(Beauvoir 1952/1974: xvii-xviii). The
Resolution fails to note that men too are
vulnerable as sexed beings in war, and in
fact nowhere does the resolution explicitly
refer to men. As Shepherd notes, ‘‘man’ is
very much the absent presence. ‘He’, how-
ever, is represented, embodying the subject
of the United Nations Secretary-General’
(Shepherd 2008: 121). 
Although men are never specifically
mentioned in the Resolution, the emphasis
on training peacekeeping personnel on the
‘special needs and human rights of women
and children’ indicates an assumption in
the Resolution that peacekeepers are men
who require such special training. Assum-
ing that peacekeepers are men is part of the
logic of masculine protection in which
those who protect (police, military, peace-
keepers, or more generally the protectionist
state) provide protection ‘in exchange for
loyalty and submission’ (Young 2007: 303-
4). This silent assumption about peace-
keepers bypasses a major discussion
amongst researchers about multiple mascu-
linities, the role of hegemonic forms of
masculinity, and the implications of
patterns of masculinity for training demo-
cratic gender relations for peace (Connell
2003: 35-39). The logic of masculine
protection also makes invisible the harm
done to men as civilians under armed
conflict. For example, Resolution 1325
expresses a concern that civilians, ‘particu-
larly women and children’, account for the
vast majority of those adversely affected by
armed conflict (Kuehnast 2011: 131). But,
as with the massacre in Srebrenica in July
1995, when between 7000-8000 men and
boys were murdered, there are many cases
in which ‘the most systematic and severe
atrocities and abuse were inflicted dis-
proportionately or overwhelmingly upon
noncombatant men’ (Jones 2004: 1). 
Whereas men are the absent present that
frames the logic of security, women are
posited as fully identified with the phrase
‘women and children’. When Cynthia
Enloe began writing this phrase as ‘women-
andchildren’, she highlighted the way in
which the binary of protector/protected
positions women as vulnerable. This iden-
tification of vulnerability with women’s role
as mothers is apparent in the language of
the Security Council. As Charli Carpenter
has noted, in the four years from 1999 to
2003, the Security Council used the phrase
‘women and children’ 163 times, ‘women
as combatants’ six times, and ‘men as
vulnerable’ once (cited in Puechguirbal
2010: 172). And indeed, women are
vulnerable as mothers when they see their
children murdered in front of their eyes, or
their daughters raped, or when they them-
selves are forcibly raped by their sons, or
when they are raped by neighbours or
enemy combatants, or when they are raped
and forcibly impregnated. In fact, the
relational violence done to families is
central to genocide (Joeden-Forgey 2010:
13). However, women also are harmed in
other ways during conflict, including in
relation to their access to property and
other economic resources. Violent up-
heavals often involve relocation, resulting
in dramatic losses economically for women.
Margaret Urban Walker notes that there is
the possibility that ‘women’s loss of liveli-
hood, land, and wealth may be eclipsed by
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the more shocking facts of mass rape,
sexualized torture and mutilation, and
sexual enslavement.’ And she argues for the
need to understand “the bidirectional
relationships between sexual abuse and
material dispossession of women” (Walker
2009: 40-41).
Thus, Resolution 1325 fails really to
prise women from the ‘womenandchildren’
unit, and it fails to prise children from this
unit as well. In doing so, it risks identifying
children’s rights with the rights of their
mothers. With respect to the mass rapes,
enforced impregnation, and enforced
maternity in Bosnia during the wars in the
1990s, this identification resulted in an
occlusion of children’s rights. Carpenter
argues that, when children who are born of
rape (‘birth-by-forced-maternity’) are
forcibly adopted out of their mother’s
community, they themselves are victims of
genocide committed by the victim commu-
nity itself (Carpenter 2000: 444).
One of the achievements of the Women,
Peace, and Security agenda is the focus on
women’s agency, in contrast to the earlier
exclusive focus on women as the vulnerable
victims of armed conflict. This new focus
on agency is stressed in Resolution 1325
through the emphasis on women’s role as
peacemakers. After expressing concern for
women and children as adversely affected
by armed conflict, the Resolution reaffirms
‘the important role of women in the pre-
vention and resolution of conflicts and in
peace-building…’ (Kuehnast 2011: 131).
Because of women’s role as peacemakers,
the Resolution emphasizes the   importance
of the representation of women at all
decision-making levels and the participation
of women in conflict resolution and peace
processes (ibid.: 132). Although  feminist
critics certainly support women  sitting at
the peace table, as Cynthia Enloe has noted
it is important to know which women are
sitting at the peace table. Often they are
the wives or daughters of the male leaders
of the warring parties, whose presence is
enough to satisfy donors, but not enough
to be taken seriously in the peacemaking
process.6
However, identifying women’s agency
with the role of peacemakers is problematic,
as it conceptually maintains the polarity of
‘men-as-naturally aggressive, women-as-
naturally peaceful’ (Cohn 2004, 14).7 As
feminist theorists have exhaustively shown,
not only does this binary erase differences
between women and men, and separate
gender from class, ethnicity, race, religion,
and sexuality, it is also empirically false to
suggest that women’s role as mothers has
endowed them with a special peacekeeping
power. Maternal ideologies have often been
highly militarized, as was the case histori-
cally under Nazism (Mosse 1985). And in
feminist discussions of just war theory,
maternal thinking has not proved to be
identical to anti-militarism. Jean Bethke
Elshtain, an early feminist working in the
field of international relations, has drawn
on maternal thinking in her criticism of the
first Gulf War (cited in Sylvester 2013: 42).
But her interest in assessing political actions
and policies on the basis of ‘what effect
these policies have on our most vital and
fragile human relationships… (from) the
standpoint of the child and the child’s
needs’ (Elshtain 1992: 55) did not prevent
her from arguing for pro-militaristic politics
post 9-11 (Elshtain 2003). 
Thus, although Resolution 1325
purportedly supports women’s agency, in
reproducing the binary identities of
masculine/feminine, aggressive/peaceful,
and protector/protected embedded in
patriarchal thinking about war, in defining
women’s agency in terms of their role as
maternal peacemakers, and in treating them
as an untapped resource for someone else’s
design (Cohn 2004: 17), the Resolution
unreflectively reiterates the very injuries to
women’s freedom that it seeks to repair. 
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GENDER AND VIOLENCE: THREE
FRAMEWORKS OF INTERPRETATION
The treatment of the concept of women in
Resolution 1325 sets the stage for the way
it addresses gender and violence, including
the notion of gender-based violence. As the
resolution treats only women as vulnerable
in war by virtue of their sex, phrases like
‘gender perspective’, ‘gender component’,
and ‘gender considerations’ become synony-
mous with women. Since these phrases in
the document are followed by references to
‘the special needs of women and girls,’ a
gender perspective  becomes equivalent to
having a perspective on those who have a
gender, that is, on women and girls. 
This identification of gender with the
concept of women is problematic in policy
discourses that embrace the language of
mainstreaming. The UN recognizes that
the category of gender is broader than the
category of women and defines gender
mainstreaming as ‘a strategy for making
women’s as well as men’s concerns and
experiences an integral dimension of the
design, implementation, monitoring and
evaluation of policies and programmes in
all political, economic, and societal spheres
so that women and men benefit equally and
inequality is not perpetuated’ (Hudson
2010: 261). Although many institutions
have renamed projects by changing the
word ‘women’ to ‘gender’, the substitution
in language has had little impact on policy
(Shepherd 2008: 120). This reduction of
gender to women overlooks how a ‘gender
perspective’ should include a study of the
masculinities of war, a topic that has been
central to feminist war    studies. 
Moreover, identifying gender with
women implies that gender is an attribute
of a subject (even though the resolution
recognizes that these attributes are
influenced by social and cultural factors),
rather than recognizing the complex and
multiple ways in which gender operates
through power relations, symbolic
meanings, discursive practices, and dynamic
processes that create the boundaries of
subjectivity and lived embodiment. For
example, it is only through recognizing
that values are gendered that researchers
can study how such values interact with
poverty, war, and alcohol in understanding
soldiers who rape. Maria Eriksson Baaz and
Maria Stern argue that hegemonic models
of masculinity are central to the sexual
violence committed by solders in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (Eriksson
and Baaz 2010: 50). It is the ‘idea and ideal
of militarized masculinity’ that a soldier
expresses when he tells his interviewers, ‘If
he has nothing in his pocket, he cannot eat
or drink his coke, he has nothing to give to
a woman – he will take her by force’ (Baaz
and Stern 2010: 31-2), and when he
distinguishes these ‘lust’ rapes from ‘evil’
rapes driven by a wish to humiliate and
degrade victims. The dynamics of gender
positions can also be actively used by
individuals in navigating war zones. Mats
Utas has coined the term victimcy to catch
sight of the dynamics in which a woman
presents herself as a victim of sexual
violence as a strategy of social navigation in
war zones to gain access to health care that
is otherwise not accessible (Utas 2005).
Here I will identify three conceptual
frameworks for analyzing the relationship
between gender and violence. The first
framework treats violence as acts that are
committed against individuals because of
their sexuality and gender, and is the frame-
work that can be traced in Resolution
1325. This is also the approach subsumed
under the concept of ‘sexual and gender-
based violence’, widely referred to by the
acronym SGBV, which includes ‘rape…
sexual threats, exploitation, humiliation,
assaults, molestation, domestic violence,
incest, involuntary prostitution (sexual
bartering), torture, insertion of objects into
genital openings and attempted rape.
Female genital mutilation and other harm-
ful traditional practices (including early
marriage which substantially increases
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maternal morbidity and mortality) are
forms of sexual and gender-based violence
against women….’8 The harms referred to
under SGBV include a wide range of acts,
and it is crucial for women’s health and
safety that such acts be prevented and,
when not prevented, punished. Resolution
1325 treats gender violence in war as ‘rape
and other forms of sexual abuse’ and ‘sexual
and other violence against women and
girls’ (Kuehnast 2011: 133-4). Under the
Women, Peace and Security agenda, these
have become issues of international peace
and security. 
Although the international recognition
of sexual violence committed against
women and girls is long overdue, there are
also limitations with this framework for
understanding the relationship between
violence and gender. Violence is treated as
an aberration from normal relations, a sick-
ness which is attributed to armed conflict as
opposed to peacetime relations. It is
assumed to be wielded by combatants and
can only be remedied by peace operations
(Väyrynen 2004: 130). In this approach,
one precludes the possibility that violence
can be wielded by states under normal
conditions or by non-combatants before,
during, or after periods of armed conflict,
or that gender violence can be wielded
against men and boys. Violence is treated
as actions committed by armed male perpe-
trators against female victims in conflict,
thereby delimiting violence in terms of its
space (as belonging to inter-community
relations (Väyrynen 2004: 132)), time
(taking place during conflict rather than
pre/post-conflict), subjects (with a focus
on men as individual perpetrators), objects
(with a focus on women and girl as victims
of violence) and mode (with a focus on
sexual violence and violence against
women). 
This way of understanding violence is
close to an everyday understanding of
violence in terms of aggressive individuals
who intentionally inflict harm on weaker
individuals. It provides an easily opera-
tionalized approach, suitable for a quantita-
tive focus on counting and recording of the
number of incidents. And it makes a clear
distinction between physical violence and
other forms of violence, such as symbolic
violence embodied in language or systemic
violence within economic and political
systems, which appears as part of the nor-
mal state of affairs and is thereby invisible9
(Zizek 2008: 1-2). But instead of thinking
of violence in terms of specific incidents, it
is crucial to understand that violence is an
event and that its occurrence and re-occur-
rence become part of the expectations of
individuals who suffer it. Bruce Lawrence
and Aisha Karim argue in writing about
violence, ‘Whether individual or group-
specific, whether erupting in the private or
in the public domain, violence is always and
everywhere process. As process, violence is
cumulative and boundless. It always spills
over. It creates and recreates new norms of
collective self-understanding’ (Lawrence
and Karim 2007: 11–12).
Taking a non-instrumental, process-
oriented approach to violence leads one
beyond the first framework to a second
framework, which views violence as
productive of gendered subjectivities and
bodies. Shepherd argues, ‘Instances of
violence are one of the sites in which
gender identities are reproduced. Thus
gendered violence is the violent reproduc-
tion of gender’ (Shepherd 2008: 51). In
this framework, the violent reproduction of
gender includes the wide variety of abuses
linked to the notion of SGBV. But this
second framework also focuses on the wide
range of social, symbolic, and economic
forms of violence that are also part of the
violent reproduction of gender, including
material dispossession, lack of access to
health care, and lack of education. With
SGBV, as with other forms of bureaucra-
tized language, one needs to be wary of
how acronym thinking may create a narrow
or misguided focus in policy.10
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However, catching sight of the violent
reproduction of gender in this second
framework of analysis raises what philo-
sophers would call the transcendental
question of the conditions for the possibi-
lity of this violence. Walter Benjamin
pursued this thought when he carried out a
historico-philosophical critique of violence
and argued that violence has a law-making
or law-preserving character (Benjamin
1986: 283-4). Law-making is power-
making, and as such is a manifestation of
violence (Benjamin 1986: 295), an insight
that applies to norm-making as well. Here
one can understand the need for a third
framework for understanding the relation-
ship between violence and gender – that
violence is immanent in norms of gender,
highlighting the constitutive role of
violence in the second framework. The
soldiers in the Democratic Republic of
Congo who distinguish lust rapes from evil
rapes do not question the ideal of mascu-
linity as entitling them to access to women,
whether by money or by force. And donor
agendas that only provide health care to
victims of sexual violence reinforce the
gender stereotype of women as victims and
deprive them of life-saving resources. The
violence suffered in these examples lurks in
the very norms and ideals that drive these
everyday practices.
One might object that widening the
concept of violence to violent processes
that may be systemic, symbolic, or norma-
tive is too broad, and implies that any form
of classification is a form of violence.11
And indeed theories of performativity
acknowledge that marking off has norma-
tive force and does some violence (Butler
1993: 11). But this insight does not
preclude us from distinguishing between
different forms or intensities of violence, or
from acknowledging that some forms of
violence fundamentally undermine the way
human beings make sense of the world,
understand themselves as embodied beings,
and understand others (Staudigl 2011: 202).
THE POLITICS OF AMBIGUITY
Feminist academics argue that Resolution
1325 displays an essentialist inheritance in
characterizing women as maternal peace-
makers, in linking women’s political roles
with their biological capacities, and in
identifying gender with women. Feminist
criticisms of essentialism can be traced back
to Simone de Beauvoir’s insights in The
Second Sex that one is not born a woman
but rather becomes a woman, and it is to
the concept of situation that one must turn
to make concrete definitions of human
groups ‘without enslaving them to a time-
less and deterministic pattern’ (Fricker
2003: 209-10). Although Gayatri Spivak
has earlier argued that a feminist ‘cannot
afford not to be essentialist’ – that is,
cannot afford not to affirm the bodily,
epistemological, political, and ontological
basis of feminism (Braidotti 1994: 189,
177) – I propose instead that, in thinking
about gender and security, one should take
the risk of ambiguity.
Some feminists inspired by Critical
Security Studies refer to ‘zones of ambigu-
ity’, an acknowledgement that the binary
opposition between non-combatants and
combatants holds less in post-Westphalian
wars than in traditional Clausewitzean wars
(Våyrynen 2007: 135). The notion of
zones of ambiguity is a reminder that non-
combatants also contribute to warfare (e.g.,
providing medical services, food, shelter),
and also may be targeted in combat (e.g.,
through mass rapes or gender-selective
mass murder). Shepherd refers to ‘a femi-
nist politics of uncertainty’ (Shepherd
2008: 50) that interrogates the reproduc-
tion of differences, such as sexual, ethnic,
or religious differences, rather than assum-
ing given differences as a starting point for
feminist political theory or practice.
In a philosophical key, ambiguity as used
by Beauvoir is rooted in an understanding
of human existence as finite, temporal,
embodied and inter-subjective. The notion
of ambiguity stresses that human beings are
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not defined by a pre-existing concept or
identity, but also acknowledges that it is the
concrete situation that provides the material
parameters for our bodies and lives.
Ambiguity underscores the multiple signifi-
cations and indeterminacy of meaning
(Langer 2003: 90). With its focus on inter-
pretation and situation (both the body as
situation and the body in situation), the
concept is used in certain philosophical,
ethical, and literary approaches. But as the
notion of ambiguity provides neither a
method nor a concrete goal – indeed, it
challenges the reliance on pre-fabricated
methods of analysis and the assurance that
goals can certainly be achieved – it seems
counter-intuitive to appeal to ambiguity in
discussions of gender and security.
Nonetheless, taking the risk of ambiguity in
addressing issues of gender and security
opens important possibilities. This concept
breaks apart the binaries that have haunted
this discourse, allowing one to catch sight
of how human beings are differently
vulnerable as sexed beings during war, as
well as in pre-war and post-war moments. 
With regard to the Women, Peace and
Security agenda, a politics of ambiguity
would acknowledge that addressing peace
and security for women also involves
addressing peace and security for men and
boys, who may be the brothers, husbands,
sons, fathers, neighbours, teachers,
tormenters, or friends of women. Men are
also vulnerable as sexed beings in war, both
in terms of how war reproduces certain
patterns of masculinity, and how men suffer
violence in warfare either through sexual
selection (as in massacres against civilian
men) or through sexual violence or dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation.
These processes of violence are interrelated,
as the fear of being identified as homo-
sexual is one of the factors in the under-
reporting of sexual violence against men
(Sivakumaran 2007: 271-2). Peace and
security for men should also secure access
to health care, as well as ensure that they
receive salaries for their services (e.g., the
case of the soldiers in the Democratic
Republic of Congo who had nothing in
their pockets). 
As the concept of ambiguity insists on a
temporal focus, in the context of peace and
security it draws attention to how violence
has a transformative impact on human lives
and social relations well beyond the specific
war zones, wartime, or sector of society
(Sylvester 2013: 25). Hans Joas has argued
that the experience of violence leaves
lasting marks not only on the victims but
also the perpetrators. In a study of
American Vietnam war veterans who had
actively participated in maltreatment while
in   combat, the incidence of suicide, fatal
car accidents, poisonings, drug over-
doses and arrests for acts of violence
distinguished combat veterans from other
groups. Combat, he notes ‘transforms the
soldiers’ personality so that their relation to
violence is changed over the long term’
(Joas 2003: 117-18). Societies that experi-
ence chronic conditions of war or inter-
group conflict also experience an  increase in
family violence (Minow 2002: 64). Hence,
one cannot separate the issue of women’s
security in war from women’s security in
domestic civilian life, both with respect to
domestic rape (rape of civilians in ‘peace-
time’) and domestic violence (family violence).
Moreover, as the concept of ambiguity
focuses on situation, as opposed to pre-
given categories of identity, it opens a wide
lens of analysis for understanding the
conditions of the situation in which
gendered identities, meanings, and values
are reproduced. Such a wide lens is
necessary to understand how violence
reproduces gender identities, for example,
through bureaucratic procedures or
legislation regarding reproductive rights.
Finally, in drawing attention to the lived
experience of this situation, a politics of
ambiguity highlights the human price paid
to laws and norms when trading protection
for submission.
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THE ROLE OF FEMINIST CRITICS
Here I have presented substantive criticisms
of the concepts of women, gender, and
violence embedded in Resolution 1325,
while also applauding its significance in
raising the issues of gender and violence to
the level of international security. I have
highlighted problematic binaries, the
identification of gender with women, and
the failure to understand the dynamic
processes of gender and violence. In this
context, I have identified three frameworks
in the interpretation of gender and
violence, arguing that it is insufficient to
understand gendered violence solely in
terms of acts committed against individuals
because of their sexuality and gender.
Instead, one needs to understand how
violence reproduces gendered bodies and
subjectivities, as well as how violence is
immanent in the laws and norms sustaining
such relationships. As an alternative to
the form of essentialism embedded in
Resolution 1325, I have turned to the
philosophical notion of ambiguity, which
opens up questions about the complex
conditions for situations of violence, the
multiple actors involved, their inter-
relations, and the on-going impact of these
factors over time. But as one reviewer of
this article asked, ‘Which actor should use
this politics of ambiguity (national legi-
slators, civil servants, UN diplomats, NGO
activists)?’. 
This question highlights the different
interest groups in this discussion, as well
the precarious position of academic critics
engaged in the work of knowledge produc-
tion. Ambiguity is a concept of interpreta-
tion that is not translatable into specific
methods, strategies or goals. And yet the
concept also displays the ‘theory gap’ that
exists between feminist academics working
with issues of gender and violence, and
legislators, civil servants, diplomats, and
activists. What does this ‘theory gap’ mean
for the question? Should feminist critics
make friends with the beast? The role of
the theorist is to provide epistemological
and political interventions when they are
called for, rather than provide an affirma-
tive account of social relations. Feminist
researchers who debate with the Women,
Peace and Security agenda are acting as
‘specific’ intellectuals (Foucault 1980: 126)
in engaging in a contestation over concepts
that have been mainstreamed by interna-
tional institutions of governance. In doing
so, they implicitly maintain both that ideas
matter, and that institutions like the UN
can instantiate progressive goals. In this
sense, my answer to this question is a pro-
visional ‘yes’. But as the role of the theorist
– here in the guise of the feminist critic – is
to interrogate what counts as knowledge
and analyze its political implications, this
answer can only ever be provisional. 
NOTES
1. Resolutions 1325, 1889, 1820, and 1888 are
included as Appendices in Kuehnast 2011. My 
references to the texts of the resolutions will be by
page number to this book.
2. http://www.peacewomen.org/security_coun-
cil_monitor/about-women-peace-and-security-
agenda?adhocpage=4446 accessed March 6, 2013.
3. Even though Socrates argued in the Apology
(303-31c) that he was a gift to the Athenians in
acting as a gadfly in arousing, persuading and 
reproaching them, he was still condemned to
death.
4. For a thorough discussion of the concepts and
challenges of gender mainstreaming, I refer the
reader to the FEMCIT Gender Mainstreaming 
Report, Hilda Rømer Christensen, “Mainstream-
ing Gender, Diversity, and Citizenship: Concepts
and Methodologies” 2011, 
http://www.femcit.org/files/WP7_Workingpa-
perNo4Revised.pdf 
5. To the historical and political arguments against
defining individuals in terms of pre-existing
essences, one can add the existentialist objection.
According to existentialists, a human being is not
defined in advance as having an essence; rather, 
existence precedes essence. But a human being is 
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not free to be anything whatsoever, since she/he is
situated.
6. Cynthia Enloe made these comments during 
a workshop meeting of the ‘Gender, Power, 
Violence’ group held at the University of Iceland
on November 5, 2011.
7. Lene Hansen draws on the methods of 
discourse analysis to show how the meaning of
such binaries is constructed ‘through the 
discursive juxtaposition between a privileged sign
on the one hand and a devalued one on the other’
leading to ‘a conceptualization of identity in 
relational terms…’ (Hansen 2006: 19). Shepherd
describes her own approach also as ‘discourse-
theoretical analysis’ (Shepherd 2008: 19). 
8. This is the definition provided in UNFPA 
Reproductive Health in Refugee Situations: An  
Inter-Agency Field Manuel, Chapter 4,
http://www.unfpa.org/emergencies/manual/4.h
tm accessed March 12 2013.
9. See my discussion of violence in Schott 2013.
10. Cynthia Enloe notes the danger in acronym
thinking: ‘Not feeling outrage, allowing oneself to
slip into a bureaucratized distancing – for instance,
reducing acts of gang rape to ‘GPV ’ – will not 
enable one to stay focused…’ (Enloe 2010: 307).
11. Julie Zahle raised this question after my talk at
the Forum for Samfundsvidenskabernes Filosofi,
University of Copenhagen, on March 13, 2013. I
would like to thank the audience for this and other
useful questions.
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